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Mind Association and Analysis Trust Studentship Award Winners

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The Mind Association and the Analysis Trust are delighted to announce the winners of their Studentship competition for 2020-21. Mind Studentships are awarded to James Laing and James Openshaw. James Laing will be based at the University of York, working on interpersonal self-consciousness; James Openshaw will be at the University of Warwick, working on objectual memory. The Analysis Committee has awarded the Analysis Studentship to Leonie Smith, for a project on epistemic harm and reparations, hosted by the University of Manchester.”

Mind Association AGM 2020

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Meeting date: Friday 10th July

The annual general meeting of the Mind Association is open to all members of the Mind Association. The AGM ordinarily takes place at the Joint Session. This year it will be held online from 1pm on Friday 10th July. If you would like to receive an invitation to attend and / or copies of the Director’s and Treasurer’s reports, please contact the Association’s administrator in advance at

Mind and Analysis Studentships 2020-21

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Deadline for applications: Tuesday 31 March 2020

The Analysis Trust and the Mind Association each propose to award a studentship equal to the full-time maintenance grant for an Arts and Humanities Research Council postgraduate studentship for the year 2020-2021 (ie £15,285). These studentships are designed to support a promising philosopher who does not have other means of support (e.g. a temporary or permanent lectureship or a research fellowship) and to enable them to conduct full-time research. The funds are solely for maintenance and support of research, and not institutional overheads.

Candidates for the studentship should, at the time of taking up the award, have completed at least three and no more than five years of full-time research, or the part-time equivalent. Candidates may make a case for circumstances that exempt them from these eligibility criteria. They should propose to spend the year pursuing research at a university in the UK or Republic of Ireland. This may, but need not, be the university where they have conducted their doctoral studies. The research should be on a subject which falls under the concerns of the journals Analysis and Mind, for example (but not exclusively) metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, logic, philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy. It is envisaged that the successful candidate will have recently completed a Ph.D. or be very close to completion, and have a CV which would make them a strong contender for a Junior Research Fellowship or similar appointment.

An application for the studentship should be made by email to Professor Ben Colburn (, secretary to the joint committee. It should consist of a CV, a statement of proposed research of not more than 500 words, and an official letter offering facilities in the department in which the candidate proposes to hold the studentship (this should at least consist in access to computers, the library and research seminars in the department). Applicants should also ensure that two references are sent to Professor Colburn (at the address above) by the deadline for applications: Tuesday 31 March 2020.

Short-listed candidates will be invited to submit some written work of up to 8,000 words in early May. The Secretary of the joint committee will communicate the results of the competition to successful applicants in late June.

Please visit the page for further details of how to apply: Research studentships 2018/19.

Mind Association and Analysis Trust Studentship Award Winners

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The Mind Association and the Analysis Trust are delighted to announce the winners of their Studentship competition for 2018-19. The Studentships are designed to support a promising philosopher who does not have other means of support, and to enable that individual to conduct full-time research. The joint committee has made two awards for 2018-19. The Mind Studentship is awarded to Alexander Moran, who will be working at the University of Cambridge on a project entitled ‘Perceptual Experience and the Physical World’. The Analysis Studentship is awarded to Katharine O’Reilly, who will be working at King’s College London on a project exploring prudentialism in ancient moral philosophy.

Research Fellows 2018-19

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The Mind Association is delighted to announce its two six-month research fellows for 2018-19. Fellowships have been awarded to Dr Stephen DeWijze (Manchester) and Dr Mona Simion (Glasgow). Brief abstracts of their respective projects are set out below.

Stephen deWijze, Dirty Hands: A Philosophical Analysis

The problem of ‘dirty hands’ is concerned with sui generis moral scenarios where good persons seeking to act morally are obliged to commit a serious moral violation in order to bring about a lesser evil. This characterisation of such scenarios tends to be rejected by both consequentialist and deontological theories as incoherent on the grounds that it is logically impossible to commit an action that is both wrong and right at the same time. My monograph argues against this orthodoxy and rehabilitates the problem of ‘dirty hands’ within contemporary ethical theory. It  provides a sustained philosophical defence of ‘dirty hands’ scenarios, develops a particular conception of dirty hands, and then explores the implications of such a notion for our understanding of ethics in general, both normative and practical.

Mona Simion, Epistemic Norms: A Function-First Account

We often believe without sufficient evidence, assert based on hunches, or rush into action without checking the facts. When we do, we are subject to criticism. This suggests that our beliefs, assertions and actions are governed by epistemic norms. This study develops a novel, integrated account of the epistemic norms governing belief, assertion and practical reasoning. Its central thesis is that these norms are generated by epistemic functions.