Mind Association and Analysis Trust Studentship Award Winners

By | Uncategorised | No Comments

The Mind Association and the Analysis Trust are delighted to announce the winners of their Studentship competition for 2018-19. The Studentships are designed to support a promising philosopher who does not have other means of support, and to enable that individual to conduct full-time research. The joint committee has made two awards for 2018-19. The Mind Studentship is awarded to Alexander Moran, who will be working at the University of Cambridge on a project entitled ‘Perceptual Experience and the Physical World’. The Analysis Studentship is awarded to Katharine O’Reilly, who will be working at King’s College London on a project exploring prudentialism in ancient moral philosophy.

Research Fellows 2018-19

By | Uncategorised | No Comments

The Mind Association is delighted to announce its two six-month research fellows for 2018-19. Fellowships have been awarded to Dr Stephen DeWijze (Manchester) and Dr Mona Simion (Glasgow). Brief abstracts of their respective projects are set out below.

Stephen deWijze, Dirty Hands: A Philosophical Analysis

The problem of ‘dirty hands’ is concerned with sui generis moral scenarios where good persons seeking to act morally are obliged to commit a serious moral violation in order to bring about a lesser evil. This characterisation of such scenarios tends to be rejected by both consequentialist and deontological theories as incoherent on the grounds that it is logically impossible to commit an action that is both wrong and right at the same time. My monograph argues against this orthodoxy and rehabilitates the problem of ‘dirty hands’ within contemporary ethical theory. It  provides a sustained philosophical defence of ‘dirty hands’ scenarios, develops a particular conception of dirty hands, and then explores the implications of such a notion for our understanding of ethics in general, both normative and practical.

Mona Simion, Epistemic Norms: A Function-First Account

We often believe without sufficient evidence, assert based on hunches, or rush into action without checking the facts. When we do, we are subject to criticism. This suggests that our beliefs, assertions and actions are governed by epistemic norms. This study develops a novel, integrated account of the epistemic norms governing belief, assertion and practical reasoning. Its central thesis is that these norms are generated by epistemic functions.